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Abstract
A dynamic equilibrium model is constructed  to analyze  the implications of different degrees
of central  bank independence.  In the main model,  each  period agents  are  pennitted  to vote
on the desired inflation  and labor taxes  in order to finance a specified level of government
spending. In this case  multiple perfect-foresight equilibria arise,  which depend on the initial
conditions of the economy.  It  is shown that agents  will  choose to levy only one tax at a
tirne,  rather than  selecting  some  version  of a "tax-smoothing"  policy. One of these  equilibda
display cycles  which exhibit fluctuations in output, investment, and the in{lation  rates as a
result of permitting agents  to vote. If instead  of having  agents  vote each  period on these
parameters, inflation and labor taxes  in the model axe  set at fixed levels, these fluctuations
do not appear.
The views expressed  in  this article  axe solely those of  the  authors and should not  be
attributed to the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or to the Federal Reserve Svstem.I.  INTRODUCTION
There has been a considerable  and persistent  debate  in many countries  concerning  the
optimal degree  of independence  which should  be provided  for the overseers  in control of
monetary  potcy on the one  hand,  and  the alternative  branches  of government  on t]le other.
The current paper  presents  a very  simple  dynamic  general  equilibrium framework  in which
this issue  can be studied. In particular,  it is shown  that if agents  can  vote each  period on
the optimal  level of money creation, which is interpreted as an extreme version of  the
absence  of central bank independence,  the resulting equilibrium  of the economy may be
one in which the inflation rate, as well as other economic  aggregates,  display  persistent
fluctuations, and there is a relatively h)gh average  level inflation.  This might be interpreted
to mean  that letting the legislative  branch  of government  control monetary  policy  could  be
bad in  that  it  would  lead to a great deal of aggregate  volatility.  This is potentially  an
important  development because,  to date, there are very few dynamic general equilibrium
optimizing models  which seek  to analyze  the impact  of central bank independence.  It is
also  shown  tlat  this economy  can  display  multiple equilibria,  with some  of these  equilibria
exhibiting limiting  cycles, and some without  cycles. Different  initial  conditions, or fully
anticipated exogenous  shocks are shown to be able to cause these cyclical equilibria  to
arise.
In many developing  and advanced  countries,  it seems  that there is a continuing debate  as
to how they should structure  their central  banks  so as  to Provide  the "optimal"  monetary
policy to fucilitate the attaining the highest possible  welfare for the citizens of the country.
Proponents  of central bank independence  cite the empirical analyses  of this issue  which
appear to find that more independent cenfial banks tend, on average,  to have lower rates
of inflation (see  Bade and Parkin (1982),  and Cukierman,  Webb, and Neyapti (1992)).t
However,  because  of the computational  or analy.tical  complexities  involved,  it has  been  very
difficult to construct  models  that are able to analyze  this question. In this paper a very
simple  model of the impact of central  bank independence,  or lack tlereof, is presented.The goal of this paper,  however,  is not to analyze  the choices  that individuals  will make  in
constructing  their governmental  institutions  since  tlis would seem  to be a formidable  task.
Rather, the  goal is to  characterize  tle  behavior of  an economy under alternative
institutional arrangements  so that imight  can be gained concerning the comparative
dynamic  effects  of these  different arrangements.-
There has  been  a great  deal  of related  work done  recently  in which the government  policies
are determined  endogenously,  in a similar spirit to that studied  below.  Tabellini (1991)
studies  the behavior  of government  debt in an economy  in which policies  are determined
by majority rule.  Tabellini  and Alesina (1990) study an economy in which agents  vote on
the composition of government spending. Alesina (1988) provides a detailed set of
references  to this growing  literature.2  Cukierman  (1992)  presents  a rigorous  analysis  of the
issues  involved  in studying  and  modelling  central  bank  independence,  From an empirical
perspective,  Bade and Parkin (1982),  and Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) also
provide a detailed analysis of the apparent empirical relationship between the apparent
independence  of central banks in various countries,  and the tendency  for these same
economies to experience  low rates of inflation.3
One goal of this paper is to illustrate the importance  of analyzing  the impact that the
political structure can have on ttre behavior of a dynamic economy. An economy  in which
policy parameters are fixed according to some socially optimal criterion  can behave vet]
different from the s:rme  economy  in which a mechanism  exists  to permit economic  agents
to endogenously choose  the level of these pararreters.  In  this latter instance, important
considerations such as the distribution  of wealth may influence the level of  the policy
parameters,  which in turn can  then  influence  the future distribution  of wealth  and  the level
of these  policy parameters.  As is shown  below,  this can then produce  economic  behavior
that would notbe present  in the absence  of the endogenous  policy  formulation. Therefore,
this analysis is a step in  the direction of linking  the normative and positive analyses  of
government policies.The remainder  of this paper  is organized  as  follows. In the next section  the physical  and
political structure of this very simple economy  is described  in detail.  The economy  is
inhabited  by a population  of overlapping  generations,  each  of whom lives  for three  periods
only.  Agents work in their first two periods of life, and invest in capital for tle  last two
periods.  There is.a reserve  requirement  imposed  on all such investment  so that some
fraction of investment  must take the form of holding government  issued  fiat currency.
Each period the government  must finance a fixed level of real expenditures' In  the
benchmark  model,  at each  date  agents  vote  on the appropriate  levels  of labor taxation  and
the inflation tax, and it  is assumed  that the majority determines  the levels of  these
paramerefs.
In Section  III  a series  of exarrples  are presented.  It is shown  that tlere  can exist  multiple
steady-state  equilibri4  which depend on the initial conditions of  the economy.  The
implications  for the level  of investment  and output are studied. It is shown  that in one of
the equilibria  the inflation  tax can fluctuate dramatfually in  the model, with  the agents
collectively voting to use the labor tax"  or the inflation  tax, but never both.  This provides
some motivation  for  why one might  expect tle  antithesis of  the  usual  tax smoothing
behavior.  It is also shown how perfectly-foreseen  temporary exogenous  disturbances  can
have  persistent  and permanent  effects  on the equilibrium, and on the endogenous  policy
variables.  In the other equilibrium there are no such fluctuations, and the agents  choose
to finance  government  spending  through  a labor tax instead. This can also  be interpreted
as  an equilibrium in which the central  bank policy  is to minimize ilflation,  and therefore
there is no endogenous  policy formulation.  Section fV  contains some final temarls.
il.  THE ECONOMIC EI{VIRONMENT AND THE EQUILIBRJUM
The economy  is one in which time is discrete  and is indexed  by t  =  1,2,... Each period
there  is a generation  of agents  of size  N who enter  the economy,  and are  present  there for
three periods. For convenience  it will be assumed  that N=1.  An agent  who enters  the
economy  in period t will be said to be a member of generation  !  and is present  in theeconomy  in periods  t, t+ 1, and t+2.  Agents  have  perfect  foresigltl  concerntng  the fufure.
Each member of generation  t wishes  to consume  some  of the single  consumption  good  in
period t+1,  and t+2.  That is to say,  they do not consume  in the first period of life.
Agents have one unit of labor effort to supply  inelastically  in period t and in t+1,  and
which will produce wr., and wr,*, units of the consumption  good in periods t and tf  1
respectively.  These  wages  are measured  in units of the consumption  good.
There is a productive  capital (or storage)  technolory  in the economy  that can be used  to
transfer  the consumption  good from one period to the next. This technology  is operated
by a single  financial intermediary.a  The technolory  is constant  returns  to scale,  so that in
any period t, one unit of the consumption  good can be invested so that it will yield
4*,  (>  1) units of the consumption  good in period t+1,  which can then be consumed.
Agents  who are members  of generation  t will wish to consume  in future periods,  and can
do so by investing in the intermediary in that period.  Tte  intennediary, however, faces  a
governrnent-imposed  reserve  requirement on ttrese  deposits. For each deposit made in the
intermediary,  it must  hold a proportion of (c) units in the form of fiat currency,  which has
been  issued  by the governmen!  and ttre  remaining  (1-a) units are ttren  invested  in capital.
Hence individual agents  hold the title to assets  of financial intermediaries. Only the
intermediaries  hold tle  currency  and the agents  hold curreng/ through the intermediary.s
Let M, then denote  the aggregate  supply  of fiat currency  at the begindng of period t, and
let p, denote tle  price of the consumption  good in units of cuffency in period t.  In the
regimes  considered  below, at the beginning  of each  period t, the rate of money supply
growth for ttrat period will be denoted  ns pr+r =  (M,*, - M)M.  The government  can
change the money supply in  order to finance government consumption.  With  this
information in mind, the gross  rate of return to deposits  with the intermediary  in period
t is then r,*, = (1-c)x,*, + a(p,/p,*r). That is, the gross  rate of return to capital  is a linear
combination  of  the rates of  return  to capital and ttrat  of money.  Now  obviously the
government can use inflation  as a levy on capital.  Therefore, this will then be referred to
as  the inflation tax,  and  henceforth  the inflation rate  will be denoted  by rr,*r = (p,*,/p,)  -ljA member of generation  t has  a utility function that will be described  as  follows
1-p  l-p
where  c*,  represenls  consumption  by an agent  in period  t who is currently  in period s of his
life.  Of course,  (1/p) is meant to measure  the intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution  of
consumption  for an agen! and p>0,  p*1.7  In period t each member of generation  t
supplies  their unit of labor inelastically.  The agent  has  his labor income  taxed  at a rate  rt,.
The agent  will then invest  tle remaining  income,  so  that the period t budget  constraint  for
such an agent is then
kr,,  = wr"(l-rt,).
Here (,*,  represents  the investuent in capital  purchased  in period t by an agen! who is
currently in period (s-1) of his life, and  which is then taken into period t+1.
A member of generation  t who enters  period t+1 with kz,rr units of capital then collects
the refurn on this investrrent,  in units of the consumption  good,  in the amount  of r,*, pet
unit  of capital.  This divisible return oD investment can be consumed,  and investment for
the future periods  can  also  then  be undertaken.  The amount  of this investment  is denoted
by k .,*r. The agent also inelastically supplies  his unit of labor, and collects wage income of
w",*, and pays  taxes  on this income  at ttre rate ol rt rrr.a  Hence,  his second  period budget
constraint can then be written  as follows
c7,.1  = (k4ar,,,) * w.,-,il -'l')  -  kr,,n'
In the last period of ttre agent's life, he will consume  the total value of his after tax capital
holdings,  since  he is not able  to work. His budget  constraiDt  for this period is then written
as follows
Cz.t,z  =  kz.*zf*z'
Aggregate  output is then measured  as t&e quantity  of goods  created  in a period by bothfactors,  labor and capital,  and is written ase
Y, = (1 - d)(kr,,  kt.,)r,  * (wr.,  * wr,).
The second  part of this expression  reflects  labor income,  and the first part reflects the
output prodnced  through from saving,  of which'(l-c)  is the fraction actually  invested  in
capital. The tax rate that appears  in the budget  constraints  (rt, ), as  well as  the inflation
rate (2,), have  yet to be determined.  Although the agents  will later take these  parameters
as  given,  it is assumed  that at ttre beginning  of every  period q the members  of generation
t-2, t-1, and t vote on the size of these  policy variables. It is also assumed  that these
parameters  cannot be negative. After these  policy variables  are determined,  the agents
maximize utility  subject to their budget constraints  while acting as pdce takers, and taking
as  given the behavior  of other agents,  including  the behavior  of future generations.
Since  money  is held as  a resewe  requirement  in the financial  intermediary  it is necessarily
the case  rhat the following equilibrium condition be satisfiedl0
M
u(kz, * kr.,)  = 
;.
(1)
In any period t the governmetrt must spend G, units of the consumption good on its own
consumption. This must be financed by utilizing the labor tax, or the inflation  tax, or some
combination  of both.  Hence the government budget constraint can then be written  as
follows
f",l G,  =  a(k,,.  o,,r[+l * (w,.,  +  w",)te,.  (2)
The first component of this expression  is the tax base  for the inflation tax, multiplied by the
inflation tax rate.  The second  component  is the revenue  derived  from labor taxation. It
is now instructive to begin with the analysis  of the optimization problem faced  by a member






subject to the constraints
cz.,  = @2,r,)+ w^,(1'  -rt,)  -  k\,,r,
ct,,,t = kz,,,rl,,t'
The solution to this problem is easily seen to be
Ir]'. t, = 
[+lt-,,r,' 
w,,qr-,',1],
where 0, :  (Fr,t;or)th.  Substituting  equations  (4)
yields the following  indirect utility  function
,  I  r  lf
V.(r).r.\ =l  ^ 
llk".r *
L(1  - p)lt'"
=[#]t-.,'.
,.,1r  -";;f-'  [r  .  u+,,F)]
k- wr,1t-ri)]. (4)
back into the utility function (3) then
(5)
This equation defines the utility,  at the beginning of period !  of a generation t-1 agent.
For convenience this value function is written as  a function of the variables (rr,, r,)  ttrat are
chosen  at the beginning  of period !  since  t,*, = (1-c)&*, + al(L+tr,).  However,  it should
be clear that this value function is also  dependent  on the levels  of the contemporaneous
labor income, the capital stock, retum to capital, and additionally, the levels of future poltcy
variables. The agent who is a member of generation  t-1 must maximize equation (5)
zubject  to equation (2), subject  to the constraints  tlat  tt,  r',  2 0.  Now, substitution  of a
version  of equation  (2) into equation  (5) yields  a  value  function  for members  of generation
t-1, at the beginning of period t, which is a function of the labor tax rate (rc,) and the
inflation rate (2,).The voting behavior  of most  of tle population  is easily  descnbed.  The young  agents  in any
period will choose  to have  all government  spending  financed  by the inflation tax since  they
hold no capital,  and their sole  source  of income  is derived  from their labor, The old agents
will in turn choose  the opposite: they will want to have only a labor tax since they earn no
labor income  but instead  hold only capital. Hence,  the determination  of the equilibrium
tax  rates  will then  be made  by the middle-aged  agents.  These  middle-aged  agents  then  will
prefer the values  of (zt,) and (zr,)  which maximize  tleir  value function (5) zubject  to the
govertrment  budget constraint  (2).1r
It is assumed  that when agents  make their voting decisions,  ttrey  are playing  a Nash  game
against future generations.  That is, they choose  (2r,, zr',)  while taking as given the voting
behavior and investment  decisions  of other agents  in present and future generations.
Clearly  there is no uncertainty or incomplete inforrration  about the behavior of  other
agents since this is an economy of perfect foresight.  After  having voted and detennined
the equilibrium  tax rates, they act as price takers when making their  consumption and
investment  decisions.
To make the specification of tle  equitbrium  nature of the economy more formal, it may
be useful to proceed  with the following definition.
Definition:  A Perfect  Foresight  Compefirtve  Equilibriam for this economy is a collection
of non-negative  sequences  {4, G,,  w',  wzn  kauu  k:,,-r,  ca, cr,.,  or, r'. }!=,, such  that for t>1,
the following conditions  are satisfied:
i)  For  members of  generation  t-L, given tle  levels of  {+,  G", wlsr w23,  k,.,  k,",
,r,*1,  ?d"*1)-,=,,  the period t parameters  1tr,,  r2,) are  chosen  to maximize  the value  function
as  given  by equation (5), subject  to the government's  budget  constraint  (2).
ii)  Given the policy  parameters  (a,, rr,), tle return  to capital  (r,, r,*),  and endowments
(wr,n  wa,), the quantities (kzo kr,o  can  e.,) maximize  the utility function, subject  to the
budget  constraints.  This implies  the decision  rules  descnibed  by equation  (4) are satisfied.
iiD  The government  budget  constraint  (2) holds  for each  period.tq  The money  market equilibrium condition  (1) is satisfied  in each  period.
The specification of the equilibrium is somewhat  complex, since the agents are taking the
contemporaneous  state  variables,  as  well as  future choice  variables  as  given  when making
their  voting  decisions.  Subsequently,  they act as price takers when making their
consumption and savings  decisions. It is possible to analytically characterize the behavior
of the value function (5) as the parameters  zr,  and  t2,  are varied,  but this turns out not to
be a very instructive exercise.  Rather than proceed with  an analysis of this sort in  this
somewhat general setup, it will be much more instructive to examine a few examples,  and
this is done in the following section.
ru.  SAMPLE ECONOMIES
At this point it will be illustrative to explore the dynamic  behavior of the model.  Although
some  analytical  characterization  of the solution  can  be  performed,  this does  not adequately
or easily  lead to an understanding  of the dynamic  behavior  of the economy. In spite the
relative simplicity of the economy,  this difficulty is due to the choices available to agents,
and due to the infinite horizon of the economy. Instead,  it would appear to be more
fruitful  to gain insight by analyzing the following examples.
Examole  #1: This example  illustrates ttre multiple equilibria tlat  are present in the
model, as well as the fact that agents  will  occasionally  choose  to levy an inflation  tax - or
capital  levy  -  in  order  to  finance  govemment  spending.  Consider  the  following
parameterization  for the economy:  wL, = war =  20, G, -- 2, xr:  1.05,  p =  2.0, a=.10,
F =  ,95.  There are two initial conditions  for the economy:  kz.r =  18.5,  and k .r =  21.
Figure 1 shows  the resulting  behavior  of the capital  stocks  in this example. Figure  2 shows
ttre behavior  for tle  labor tax and  the inflation tax. Obviously,  in this example  agents  are
choosing to finance govemment spending  through either the labor tax, or the inflation  tax,
but not both simultaneously. The labor tax fluctuates  between  SVo  and zero, while the
inflation rate fluctuates  between  132Vo  altd  zero.t2 As a result, the level of real outputalso fluctuates  in tlis  equilibrium, taking values  of 80.666  in odd periods,  and 80.925  in
even  periods.
The reason  why these  fluctuation occur  is as  follows. Inherent in the decision  to be made
by the niddle-aged agents  is a consideration  of the level  of government  consumption  to be
financed  and tax burden to be levied,  and the way  that agents  can minimize their welfare
loss from these taxes. In the first period the oldest agents  axe  relatively rich in capital, and
consequently the middle-aged agents  wish to have capital taxed through the inflation  tax,
and not to tax labor at all.  Since  ttre labor income  of tle  young in period f. is then not
taxed, these latter agents are relatively capital-rich in period 2, and therefore they vote to
tax labor in  this period -  the reverse  of what happened  in period 1.  This behavior
subsequently  repeats  itself every  two periods  after ttris.
In each period the middle-aged agents  weigh the relative (utility)  costs  imposed by levying
the labor and inflation taxes. These  same  agents  are susceptible  to paying  both taxes  if
they hold any capital,  and so it seems  natural that they would choose  to vote for the tax
that maximizes their welfare.l3 Although the levels of wr.,  and kr,, do not directly affect the
decisions  of a member of generation  t-1, since  they are not a component  of his wealth,
these variables do influence the voting behavior of these agents  indirectly. The higher are
these  variables,  the greater  tle capabilities  to a  member  of generation  t-l  of minimizing  his
own tax burden by foisting it  instead  on the nembers of either the older or younger
generations.  For exanple,  the higher  (lower)  is q,, relative  to w.,, and the lower (higher)
is k,, relative  to k ,, tle more (less)  likely it will be that the member  of generation  t-L will
vote in period t to tax labor (capital).
It should also  be stated  that in tle  absence  of positive  government  spending,  there  would
not be any fluctuations  for this economy,  and instead  there would be a single  stationary
equilibrium. Similarly,  it can easily  be seen  that the magnitude  of the present  fluctuations
are closely related to the size of the level of governnent spending. That is, the higher the
level of G,, the greater  is the magnitude  of the fluctuations.
10Exarnple  #2: This  example  is  exactly  the  same  as  in the  previous  one  except  that  the
initial conditions  are different. In tlis  case  kr, =  18,  and kt,,,  -- 17. The resulting  paths
for tle  capital stocks  are shown  in Figure  3.  In the initial period the middle-aged  agents
are capital-rich,  and therefore they choose  to have labor taxed  in period L, rather than
choose  the inflation tax as in tle  previous  example. In the subsequent  period, the old
agents  are still not sufficiently  capital-rich  to convince  the middle-aged  agents  to choose
a high level of inflation, and therefore a labor tax is employed  again.  This behavior
continues  forever,  with a labor tax rate of 5Vo  beng implemented  in every  period.
Obviously, the behavior of the economy in this example is identical to ttrat which would
arise  if there were a rule or law that mandated  tlat  all government  spending  be financed
through the labor tax,  and  the inflation rate  always  be set  to zero,  irrespective  of the initial
conditions.ra  Clearly  the result  from such  a policy  would be an equilibrium in which cycles
do not appear  in the level of output, capital  stock,  inflation rate, or the rate of return to
capital. In light of tle  behavior  observed  in Example  #1 (and Example  #3 below),  it is
possible  to conclude  that within a choice-theoretic  general  equilibrium model, removing
all  forms of central bank independence can potentially lead to  higher  average  rates of
inflation,  as well  as lluctuations in  the inflation  rate and other  aggregates,  than would
otherwise be the case  if central bank were left to pursue a strict zero inflation  policy on its
owll.
Example  #3: This  example is again exactly the  same as the  first  one, with  the
exception  of the initial conditions  for the capital  stock. In this instance  k^, = 25,  and k.,
=  20. The resulting  path for the capital stocks  is illustrated in Figure 4.  Obviously  the
result is that the model exhibits a cyclical equilibrium that appears  to be identical to that
in Example  #1.  However,  this is not quite the case. In tle  first example  tle  inflation tax
is levied in odd periods,  while the labor tax is imposed  in even periods. In the present
example, altlough  tle  cycles  still exist, the opposite is tle  case. The reason  for this is that
here the middle-aged  agents  begin  period 1 witl  relatively  plenty of capital,  and  therefore
choose  to  tax labor in  this period.  From then on the reasoning  behind the cyclical
11equilibrium is identical to that in the first example.
Example #4: In this example,  tJre  economy  is identical  with that studied  in Example
#2, with the exception  of a perfectly-foreseen  labor productivity  shock  in period 1.0. In
particular,  the paraneterization  of the economy  is as  follows:  wr,ro  = 21, and otherwise  wr,,
= *.,  = 20,  Gt = 2,  x,:  1.0S,  p =2.0,a=.I0,F  = .95. There  are  two initial  values  for
the economy:  ka1  = 18,  and  kr, :  17. The levels  of labor income  are constant,  except  for
period 10,  in which case  there is a SVo  increase  in the labor income of the young agents.
Figure 5 shows  the paths for the capital stocks  in this example, while Figure 6 shows  the
paths for the inflation  and labor taxes. This example  illustrates how an expected  exogenous
disturbance  is capable  of changing  tle  steady-state  behavior  of the economy,  and moving
the economy from the non-cyclic to t&e cyclical equilibrium.  The reverse behavior is also
possible in  that  an expected exogenous  shock catr move the  economy from  the  cyclic
equilibrium  to the non-cyclic equilibrium.
This example illushates the importance  that voting, and therefore endogenous  policy
formulation, plays  in the model. If the tax rates  were  fixed arbitrarily in this example,  the
economy,  which began  in a  non-cyclic  steady-state,  would  converge  back  to this steady-state
a few  periods  after  the temporary  exogenous  disturbance.  The voting,  or endogenous  policy
formuliation, is then critical in producing the observed  fluctuations.
ry.  FNAL  REMARKS
It would seem  indisputable  that political considerations  are an important factor that help
determine  how policy  parameters  are formulated  witlin  market economies.  Yet there are
relatively  few dynamic  models  that have  these  parameters  determined  endogenously,  with
agents participating in  tle  political structure.  It  may not  be  clear a-priori,  how
incorporating these features into  a dynamic economy  will  alter the behavior of  the
economy,  but the previous  analysis  suggests  that the changes  produced  can potentially  be
dramatic.
t2The framework described  above has shown that introducing majority voting into the
determination  of tax  rates  can  also  interject  instability  or fluctuations  in various  aggregates.
Agent's different levels  of capital  and  labor income  influence  tleir  preferences  concerning
the levels of  labor and inflation taxes.  This analysis  has been conducted  within  a
ftamework  .in which the ftuctuations  would not arise  in the abselce of the voting on the
levels  ofthe policy  parameters.  Additionally,  no externalities  or "backward-bending"  supply
curues  for saving  were necessary  ingredients  in producing  the cyclical  equilibria.
One might justifiably ask which features  of the examples  are critical.  Witlin  certain
bounds,  allowing different  values  of intertemporal  substitution,  as  determined  by the value
of (1/p), will not change  the basic  nature  of the results. However,  it is not always  easy  to
construct equilibria when low values of p are chosen. The reason for this is that in this
instance the substitution effect of a change  in the interest rate becomes  very strong relative
to the wealth effect. One might also question  how the results  would change  if, say,  the
levels  of capital and labor influenced  the productivity  of each  other as  when,  for examplg
a Cobb-Douglas  tecbnology  is employed. In this case  the fluctuations  observed  above  are
still  presen!  but  are slightly different in  magnitude.  In  particular, because  of  the
interaction of the two factors  in production,  the model does  not converge  as  quickly  to its
cyclic  or  non-cyclic  equilibria.  What  is  important  in  the  present framework  is  the
endogenous  voting, and not the way that output is produced.
As has  been  emphasized  by such  as  authors  as  Barro (1979),  it would seem  appropriate  that
governments should pursue a type of  tax-smoothing policy  in  order  to  minimize  the
intertemporal  costs  of distortional  taxation. As shown  here  however,  as  well as  in Huffoian
(1993),  tax smoothing  is apparently  not something  that one might e4pect  to naturally  arise
in  environments in  which agents, acting in  their  own private self-interest, can partially
determine  the policies  that affect  their decisions.
It is left as an open question  as  to how the political structure  can influence  the behavior
of the economy  along  other dimensions.  The foregoing  analysis  suggests  that it might be
13interesting  to study  other issues  within the context  of a dynamic  model with these  sorts  of
political considerations. For example,  one might analyze  the levels of public debt or
deficits that might arise. Alternatively,  one might study  the way in which governments
migbt finance  their deficits,  and  what  the appropriate  level  of money/bond  combination  that
is appropriate. Additionally, this type  of model could also  be used  to study  how political
considerations  could  be  used  to study  the  trade-off  between  distortional  taxation  on the one
hand, and future growth on the other.
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16FOOTNOTES
1. Although, as  demonstrated  in Cukierman,  Webb and Neyapti (1992),  and  Cukierman,
Kalaitzidakis,  Summets,  and  Webb  (L993),  it can  be a  considerable  task  to characterize  how
independent  many central  banks  actually  are. This is also  a very important issue  because
it is closely  related to the issue  of policy coordination  between  the different branches  of
govemment.  Obv*arsly the issue of policy coordination arises when some PoliSy-makers
have  a gteat deal of independence  from other policy-makers.
2. What is missing  from much of the existing  literature,  and  what is the main points  of tle
present  paper,  is an explanation  of how policies  implemented  in one period influence  the
distribution of wealth in such  a manner  as  to also  influence  tle policies  tlat  are chosen  in
future periods. AIso, much of this literature  contains  analyses  of models  which are finite
horizon economies:  The model studied  in the present  paper has an infinite horizon,  and
as such permits an analysis  of how the endogenous  variables evolve over time in reaction
to various  disturbances. Alesina and  Spear  (1988)  use  the werlapping generations  model
to construct  a model of electoral  competition.
Boldrin (1993),  and Krusell and Rios-Rull (1993a,  1993b)  study  the impact  that voting can
have  in models  where factors  of production  can be accumulated. However,  they do not
address  the possfoility  of cyclical  fluctuations  as  is the focus  of the present  paper.
3.  Alesina and Summers  (1993)  point out that although  there appears  to be a negative
relationship between the degtee of central bank independence and the average rate of
inflation, there appears  to be no such discernable  relationship between  the degree of
independence  and a measure  of real economic  performance.
4.  One potential  reason for this may be that there is a minimal  investnent  level that is
necessary  before any investnetrt returns a positive amount. This minimal investrnent  level
is then more tlan  tle  potential endowment  of any single  agent  in the economy.
5,  One could alternatively  assume  that the agents  directly  hold the cn  ency  as  a reserve
requirement  against  these  deposits  with the intermediary.
6. Of course,  ttre issues  of time-inconsistency  are  being  avoided. However,  it is not clear
how or if these  problems  would arise  within the context  of a model in which policies  are
endogenously  determined  through voting.
7. Huffman (L993)  studies  a model  in which p  = 1,  which is to say  that utility is logarithmic,
so that the agents  investment  decisions  are independent  of the equilibrium interest  rate.
8. It would be relatively  straightforward  to incorporate  an endogenous  labor decision  into
the  agents  optimization  problem  by  changing  the  first  period  utility  function  to
[c, - (fr)']l-e, where d, is period t labor effort, and <o  )  1.  However,  addilg this feature
would not appear to add anything substantive  to tle  curent  analysis.
I79.  Since N=1,  there is no need here to distinguish  between  individual and aggregate
quantities.
10. Since  x, >  1, and  n, > 0, the agents  would  never  voluntarily  hold money  since  the rate
of return on money  is dominated  by that of capital.
11. It is also  assumed  that there  is no mechanism  that would permit agents  at one date  to
commit to their votes in future dates.  Obviously,  allowing this would complicate the
analysis  by adding  many  more strategic  considerations.
12. This may seem  to be an extreme  level of inflation, but this level can be made  smaller
or larger by changing  the reserve  requirement  or the agent's  discount  factor.
L3. In Huftnan  (1993)  the capital  stock  is fixed and hence  there is an endogenous  price
for capital. It is shown  within this environnent that the value  function of the middle-aged
agents,  as a function of the percentage  of the government  consumption  financed  through
the two taxes,  is convu.  Naturally, in their voting the agents  always  choose  corner solutions
with either  tle  labor tax  or a capital tax employed,  but nevet both.  In tle  present  case,
preferences  over taxes  are single-peaked,  but they always  move to corner solutions.
L4. It is not necessarily  tle  case  that tle  non-cyclic equilibrium will always  have the agents
choosing  the labor tax in each  period.  It depends  upon tle  relative sizes  of capital and
labor income  available  to middle-aged  agents.  The logic behind this result  is perhaps  best
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